ABSTRACT There are two fundamental purposes in mobile edge computing, i.e., performance enhancement and cost reduction. By offloading computation tasks to a mobile edge cloud (MEC), a user equipment (UE), also called mobile user, mobile subscriber, or mobile device, can possibly reduce its average response time, which is the main performance measure, and can possibly reduce its average power consumption. Optimizing both performance and cost may be conflicting requirements. In this paper, we optimize the cost-performance ratio (CPR), i.e., the power-time product, which combines performance (average response time) and cost (average power consumption) into one quantity. A unique feature in mobile edge computing is the competitiveness of mobile users, who are selfish in competing for resources in a mobile edge cloud. We take a game theoretic approach to the stabilization of a competitive mobile edge computing environment. The main contributions of the paper are summarized as follows. 1) We consider a mobile edge computing environment with multiple UEs and a single MEC. We establish an M/G/1 queueing model for the UEs and an M/G/m queueing model for the MEC. The UEs are entirely heterogeneous in terms of task characteristics, computation and communication speeds, and power consumption models for both computation and communication. 2) We analytically derive the average response time and the average power consumption of each UE and the MEC, so that cost-performance ratio optimization can be studied mathematically and rigorously. 3) We establish a non-cooperative game framework to systematically study the stabilization of a competitive mobile edge computing environment. Our framework includes a set of seven non-cooperative games among the UEs and the MEC, each attempts to minimize its payoff function, i.e., its cost-performance ratio. These games are different in terms of the number of variables to play and which variables to play. 4) We develop efficient algorithms for each player to find the best response in each game. All these algorithms are the poly-log time in the length of an initial search interval and the accuracy requirement. We also develop an iterative algorithm to find the Nash equilibrium of the games. 5) We demonstrate the numerical examples of our algorithms and performance data of our games for the idle-speed model and the constant-speed model respectively.
I. INTRODUCTION A. MOTIVATION
There are two fundamental purposes in mobile edge computing, i.e., performance enhancement and cost reduction [17] .
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By offloading computation tasks to a mobile edge cloud (MEC), a user equipment (UE), also called mobile user, mobile subscriber, or mobile device, can possibly reduce its average response time, which is a main performance measure, and can possible reduce its average power consumption, which is a main cost measure. By reducing the average response time and reducing the average power consumption, a UE creates an illusion of a mobile device with stronger computing power and longer battery lifetime [8] , [12] , [13] .
There are three essential parameters that a UE can control or choose to enhance its performance and to reduce its cost. All these three parameters affect the average response time and the average power consumption, and their impact on performance and cost is sophisticated and deserves serious investigation. (1) The first parameter is the amount of task offloading. It seems that increasing the amount of offloading will decrease the average response time. However, this is true only for non-offloaded tasks, since the workload on a UE is reduced. The average response time of offloaded tasks may be increased if the communication time is too long and/or an MEC is overloaded. While increasing the amount of offloading may decrease the average power consumption for computation of a UE, it definitely increases the average power consumption for communication. ( 2) The second parameter is the server execution speed. While increasing the server execution speed of a UE decreases the average response time of non-offloaded tasks, it increases the average power consumption for computation. (3) The third parameter is the data communication speed. While increasing the data communication speed of a UE decreases the average response time of offloaded tasks, it increases the transmission power and the average power consumption for communication.
Similarly, there is one essential parameter, i.e., the server execution speed, that an MEC can control or choose to enhance its performance and to reduce its cost. It is clear that increasing the server execution speed decreases the average response time, but increases the average power consumption.
Optimizing both performance and cost may be conflicting requirements. There are different ways to deal with the performance and cost tradeoff, for instances, minimization of average response time with average power consumption constraint, and minimization of average power consumption with average response time constraint [21] , and joint performance and cost optimization [7] . In this paper, we optimize the cost-performance ratio (CPR), i.e., the power-time product, which combines performance (average response time) and cost (average power consumption) into one quantity. A UE can optimize its CPR by proper choice of its computation offloading strategy and computation/communication speeds. An MEC can optimize its CPR by proper choice of its server execution speed.
A unique feature in mobile edge computing is competitiveness of mobile users, who are selfish in competing for resources in a mobile edge cloud. Therefore, collective optimization of the overall performance and/or cost of all mobile users is not interesting to anyone. Optimization of computation offloading strategy and computation/communication speeds should be carried out for each UE individually and separately, while other UEs are also doing so. In addition, an MEC can also join such a non-cooperative game. Each player in the game attempts to find his best response to the current situation by finding his best choice of the variables that minimize his CPR. We are interested in how the stable situation looks like, a situation where no one can reduce his CPR anymore and no one wants to make further change. The motivation of our investigation is to conduct a mathematical study of the above competitive and non-cooperative game and to show that such a stable situation does exist and can be found algorithmically, numerically, and efficiently.
B. SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we take a game theoretic approach to stabilization of a competitive mobile edge computing environment. The main contributions of the paper are summarized as follows.
• We consider a mobile edge computing environment with multiple UEs and a single MEC. We establish an M/G/1 queueing model for the UEs and an M/G/m queueing model for the MEC. The UEs are entirely heterogeneous in terms of task characteristics, computation and communication speeds, and power consumption models for both computation and communication.
• We analytically derive the average response time and the average power consumption of each UE and the MEC, so that cost-performance ratio optimization can be studied mathematically and rigorously.
• We establish a non-cooperative game framework to systematically study stabilization of a competitive mobile edge computing environment. Our framework includes a set of seven non-cooperative games among the UEs and the MEC, each attempts to minimize its payoff function, i.e., its cost-performance ratio. These games are different in terms of the number of variables to play and which variables to play.
• We develop efficient algorithms for each player to find the best response in each game. All these algorithms are poly-log time in the length of an initial search interval and the accuracy requirement. We also develop an iterative algorithm to find the Nash equilibrium of the games.
• We demonstrate numerical examples of our algorithms and performance data of our games for the idle-speed model and the constant-speed model respectively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review related research. In Section 3, we establish mathematical models. In Section 4, we present power consumption models for both computation and communication. In Section 5, we establish a game formulation of a competitive mobile edge computing environment. In Section 6, we develop our algorithms. In Section 7, we demonstrate numerical examples and performance data. In Section 8, we summarize the paper and mention further research directions.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review related research. Computation offloading in mobile edge computing has been a hot research topic in recent years, and extensive investigation has been conducted. The reader is referred to [2] , [15] , [17] , [24] , [27] for recent comprehensive surveys. VOLUME 7, 2019 Several researchers have considered the important issue of performance and cost tradeoff in mobile edge computing. Mao et al. investigated the tradeoff between two critical but conflicting objectives in multi-user MEC systems, namely, the power consumption of mobile devices and the execution delay of computation tasks, by considering a stochastic optimization problem, for which, the CPU frequency, the transmit power, as well as the bandwidth allocation should be determined for each device in each time slot [25] . You et al. studied optimal resource allocation for a multi-user mobile-edge computation offloading system, where each user has one task, by minimizing the weighted sum of mobile energy consumption under the constraint on computation latency, with the assumption of negligible cloud computing and result downloading time [29] . Zhang et al. proposed a joint computation offloading and resource allocation optimization scheme, aiming to minimize the total cost (which includes energy consumption, monetary cost, and execution latency for both computation and communication) of all mobile users, where each user has one task [31] . Zhang et al. studied energy-efficient computation offloading mechanisms for MEC in 5G heterogeneous networks by formulating an optimization problem to minimize the energy consumption of an offloading system with multiple mobile devices, where each device has a computation task to be completed within certain delay constraint, and the energy cost of both task computing and file transmission are taken into consideration [32] .
The game theoretical approach has been employed to study computation offloading strategies of multiple users. Cao and Cai investigated the problem of multi-user computation offloading for cloudlet based mobile cloud computing in a multi-channel wireless contention environment, by formulating the multi-user computation offloading decision making problem as a non-cooperative game, where each mobile device user has one computation task with the same number of CPU cycles and attempts to minimize a weighted sum of execution time and energy consumption [4] . Chen formulated a decentralized computation offloading decision making problem among mobile device users as a decentralized computation offloading game, where each mobile device user has a computationally intensive and delay sensitive task and minimizes a weighted sum of computational time and energy consumption [9] . Chen et al. studied the multi-user computation offloading problem for mobile-edge cloud computing in a multi-channel wireless interference environment, and showed that it is NP-hard to compute a centralized optimal solution, and hence adopted a game theoretic approach to achieving efficient computation offloading in a distributed manner [10] . Liu et al. built a cooperative game based framework for quality of service (QoS) guaranteed offloading in a multiple MECs environment, such that the number of tasks whose QoS requirements are satisfied is maximized, where both UEs and MECs are players, and each UE has one task [22] . Ma et al. researched computation offloading strategies of multiple users via multiple wireless access points by taking energy consumption and delay (including computing and transmission delay) into account, and presented a game-theoretic analysis of the computation offloading problem while mimicking the selfish nature of the individuals [23] . However, all the above works only consider the case of multiple users, where each user has only a single task.
For multiple users, where each has multiple tasks, Chen et al. constructed a non-cooperative game model to find an optimal computation offloading policy for each UE to minimize a weighted sum of energy consumption and time consumption [7] . However, the method adopted is discrete combinatorial optimization, not continuous stochastic optimization. Cardellini et al. considered a usage scenario where multiple non-cooperative mobile users share the limited computing resources of a close-by cloudlet and can selfishly decide to send their computations to any of the three tiers, i.e., a local tier of mobile nodes, a middle tier (cloudlets) of nearby computing nodes, and a remote tier of distant cloud servers [5] . However, the above study employed the M/M/1 queueing model, which is not able to capture the heterogeneity of mobile devices. Furthermore, the above study did not consider multiple heterogeneous MECs. In fact, all the above studies are for a single MEC.
There has been investigation concerning multiple MECs. Tran and Pompili studied the problem of joint task offloading and resource allocation in a multi-cell and multi-server MEC system in order to maximize users' task offloading gains, which are measured by the reduction in task completion time and energy consumption, by considering task offloading decision, uplink transmission power of mobile users, and computing resource allocation in the MEC servers [28] . However, this study did not use the game theoretic approach to dealing with competitive and selfish mobile users. Li et al. considered multiple heterogeneous mobile users competing for resources from multiple heterogeneous mobile edge clouds, where each UE and MEC is characterized by an M/G/1 queueing system, and used the game theoretic approach to finding the optimal computation offloading strategy for each mobile user when a mobile computing environment becomes stabilized [20] . However, the cost of energy consumption was not taken into consideration in the payoff function, but only the average response time.
Our research in this paper considers multiple heterogeneous UEs, each having an endless sequence of computational tasks, and a powerful multiserver MEC, with the goal of minimizing a combined metric of performance and cost, using both queueing theory and game theory.
III. QUEUEING MODELS
To rigorously investigate stabilization of a competitive mobile edge computing environment, we need to establish mathematical models. We consider a mobile edge computing environment with multiple UEs and a single MEC (see Figure 1) , where there are n mobile user equipments, i.e., UE 1 , UE 2 ,. . . , UE n , and a mobile edge cloud MEC. Throughout the paper, we use y to represent the expectation of a random variable y. Table 1 gives a list of the notations and their definitions used in this paper. (The main symbols of UE i are: In this paper, each UE i is treated as an M/G/1 queueing system. That is, UE i is actually a server. Such a server allows task inter-arrival times to follow an exponential distribution and task execution times to follow an arbitrary probability distribution (a fairly general model without extra assumptions). There is a Poisson stream of computation tasks with arrival rateλ i (measured by the number of arrival tasks per unit of time, e.g., second), i.e., the inter-arrival times are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) exponential random variables with mean 1/λ i . The arrival task stream is decomposed into two streams, that is, there is a Poisson stream of computation tasks with arrival rate λ i which are offloaded to the MEC and processed remotely in the MEC, and there is a Poisson stream of computation tasks with arrival rateλ i −λ i which are not offloaded to the MEC and processed locally in UE i . The variable λ i is actually a computation offloading strategy of UE i , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Each M/G/1 queueing system maintains a queue with infinite capacity for waiting tasks when UE i is busy in processing other tasks. The first-come-first-served (FCFS) queueing discipline is adopted.
The execution requirements (measured by the number of billion processor cycles or the number of billion instructions (BI) to be executed) of the computation tasks generated on UE i are i.i.d. random variables r i with an arbitrary probability distribution. We assume that its mean r i and second moment r 2 i are available, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The amount of data (measured by the number of million bits (MB)) to be communicated between UE i and the MEC for offloaded tasks are i.i.d. random variables d i with an arbitrary probability distribution. We assume that its mean d i and second moment d 2 i are available, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. UE i has execution speed s i (measured by GHz or the number of billion instructions that can be executed in one second), where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The communication speed (measured by the number of million bits that can be transmitted in one second) between UE i and the MEC is c i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
B. THE SERVER MODEL: M/G/m
The MEC is treated as an M/G/m queueing system. Thus, the MEC is actually a multiserver system with mixed classes of tasks from different mobile users. There is a Poisson stream of computation tasks with arrival rate λ to the MEC, where λ = λ 1 + λ 2 + · · · + λ n , and λ i is the arrival rate of the Poisson stream of computation tasks offloaded from UE i , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The MEC has m identical servers, where m is the size of the multiserver system. The M/G/m queueing system maintains a queue with infinite capacity for waiting tasks when all the m servers are busy in processing other tasks. The FCFS queueing discipline is adopted. The execution speed (measured by GHz or the number of billion instructions that can be executed in one second) of the m servers is s.
IV. POWER CONSUMPTION MODELS
In this section, we present power consumption models for both computation and communication in mobile edge computing. All powers are measured by Watts. 
A. COMPUTATION
Power dissipation and circuit delay in digital CMOS circuits can be accurately modeled by simple equations, even for complex microprocessor circuits. CMOS circuits have dynamic, static, and short-circuit power dissipation; however, the dominant component in a well designed circuit is dynamic power consumption P d,i (i.e., the switching component of power) of UE i , which is approximately P d,i = a i C i V 2 i f i , where a i is an activity factor, C i is the loading capacitance, V i is the supply voltage, and f i is the clock frequency [6] . In the ideal case, the supply voltage and the clock frequency are related in such a way that V i ∝ f φ i i for some constant φ i > 0 [30] . The processor execution speed s i is usually linearly proportional to the clock frequency, namely, s i ∝ f i . For ease of discussion, we will assume that V i = b i f φ i i and s i = c i f i , where b i and c i are some constants. Hence, we know that the dynamic power consumption is
, which can be simplified as
, and
is reasonably close to that in [14] for the Intel Pentium M processor.
We will consider two types of server speed and power consumption models. In the idle-speed model, a server runs at zero speed when there is no task to perform. Since the power for speed s i is ξ i s α i i , the average amount of energy consumed by UE i in one second is
i , where we notice that the speed of a server is zero when it is idle, and ρ i = (λ i − λ i )(r i /s i ) is the utilization of UE i to be derived in Section 5.2.1. The average amount of energy consumed by UE i in one second, i.e., the power supply to UE i , is P comp,i = ρ i ξ i s α i i . Since a server still consumes some amount of base power P s,i even when it is idle (assume that an idle server consumes certain base power P s,i , which includes static power dissipation, short circuit power dissipation, and other leakage and wasted power [19] ), we will include P s,i in P comp,i , i.e.,
In the constant-speed model, a server still runs at the speed s i even if there is no task to perform. Again, we use P comp,i to represent the power allocated to UE i . Since the power for speed
Similarly, we use P d , P s , and P to represent the dynamic, static, and average power consumption of the MEC. Then, we have
and
for the idle-speed model, and
for the constant-speed model, where s is the execution speed of the MEC, and ξ and α are some constants.
B. COMMUNICATION
In addition to power consumption for computation, a UE also consumes power for communication. Let P t,i be the transmission power of UE i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The data transmission rate c i from UE i to the MEC is
where w i is the channel bandwidth and β i is a combined quantity which summarizes various factors such as the channel gain between UE i and the MEC, the interference on the communication channel caused by other devices' data transmission to the same MEC, and the background noise power. Since the average communication time for one offloaded task from UE i to the MEC is d i /c i , the average energy consumption to complete data transmission for one offloaded task from UE i to the MEC is P t,i (d i /c i ), where
Since there are λ i tasks offloaded from UE i to the MEC in one second, the average energy consumption of data transmission for offloaded tasks from UE i to the MEC in one second, i.e., the average power consumption for communication of UE i , is
By adding the average power consumption for computation and communication together, we get the average power consumption P i of UE i as
for the constant-speed model.
V. A GAME FORMULATION
We use non-cooperative games to study computation offloading strategy and computation/communication speeds optimization for non-cooperative mobile users competing for resources from a mobile edge cloud.
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A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
In this section, we describe some background information of non-cooperative game theory. (The material in this section is adapted from Sections 4.1-4.2 of [20] and included here for the sake of completeness.) A set K ⊆ R m is convex if for any two points x, y ∈ K , the segment joining them belongs to K , i.e.,
Given a convex set K ⊆ R m , a function f (x) : K → R is said to be convex on K if for all x, y ∈ K and β ∈ [0, 1], we have
It is well known [1] that a continuous and twice differentiable function f (x) : K → R, where x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ), is convex on a convex set K if and only if its Hessian matrix
of second partial derivatives is positive semidefinite on the interior of K . Let the kth leading principal minor of the symmetric matrix H(f (x)) be the determinant of its upper-left k × k submatrix, where 1 ≤ k ≤ m. By the well known Sylvester's criterion, H(f (x)) is positive semidefinite if and only if all the leading principal minors (i.e., all these determinants) are non-negative [11] .
Given a closed and convex K ⊆ R m and an objective function f (x) : K → R, which is convex and continuously differentiable on K , the convex optimization (CO) problem, denoted by CO(K , f ), is to minimize f (x), subject to x ∈ K , i.e., to find a solution x * ∈ K , such that
Assume that there are n players in a game. The ith player controls a variable (which represents the strategy of the player)
(which is the set of strategies of the ith player) is closed and convex, for all 1
be the set of combinations of all players' strategies. We use the notation x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) ∈ K to denote the overall vector of all players' variables, and x −i = (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , x i+1 , . . . , x n ) to denote the vector of all players' variables except that of player i. Each player has a payoff function f i (x i , x −i ) : K → R. It is assumed that the payoff function f i is continuously differentiable in x and convex as a function of x i alone for every fixed x −i .
A non-cooperative game with n players is specified by
). The aim of player i, given other players' strategies x −i , is to choose an action x i ∈ K i that minimizes his payoff function f i (x i , x −i ), i.e., to
Therefore, in an n-player non-cooperative game, we have a set of n coupled convex optimization problems CO(K i , f i ), where
The purpose of the game is to find a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium (NE), i.e., a feasible point
holds for each player i = 1, 2, . . . , n. In words, a Nash equilibrium is a feasible strategy profile x * with the property that no single player i can benefit from a unilateral deviation from x * i , if all other players act according to it. It is well known that if f i (x i , x −i ) is a convex function of x i for each fixed x −i , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is a Nash equilibrium of G = (K, f) [26] .
B. NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES
In this section, we present seven non-cooperative games for non-cooperative mobile users to play to stabilize a competitive mobile edge computing environment.
1) THE UE PLAYERS
Based on the queueing model for the UEs in Section 3.1, we know that the execution times of non-offloaded tasks processed locally in UE i are i.i.d. random variables
with mean x i = r i /s i and second moment
The average waiting time of the tasks in UE i is ( [16] , p. 190)
.
The average response time of non-offloaded tasks processed locally in UE i is
Let W be the average waiting time of all tasks in the MEC, which will be derived in Section 5.2.2. Then, the average response time of offloaded tasks from UE i processed remotely in the MEC is
where x 2 and D will be defined shortly in Section 5.2.2. Therefore, the average response time (measured by seconds) of all non-offloaded and offloaded tasks generated on UE i is
Our performance measure is 1/T i , which is inversely proportional to the average response time T i , the higher, the better. Our cost measure is the average power consumption P i , the lower, the better. The cost-performance ratio (CPR) refers to a UE's ability to deliver performance for its cost. Generally speaking, a UE with lower CPR is more desirable, excluding other factors. In this paper, we define CPR as cost/performance
i.e., power-time product (measured by Watts-seconds).
2) THE MEC PLAYER
Based on the queueing model for the MEC in Section 3.2, we know that the total arrival rate of all offloaded tasks from the n UEs to the MEC is
The execution times of the tasks in the MEC are i.i.d. random variables x, which is r i /s + d i /c i with probability λ i /λ, with mean
and the second moment
, and the variance
and the coefficient of variation
It is well known that the average waiting time of all tasks in the MEC has very accurate approximation:
whereŴ is the average waiting time of all tasks in an M/M/m queueing system with the same utilization as the M/G/m queueing system [18] . The utilization of the MEC is 
x 2 , and mρ = λx,
where
The average response time of all tasks in the MEC is
The cost-performance ratio of the MEC is R = PT .
3) THE GAMES
In this paper, we consider seven non-cooperative games with n+1 players, i.e., UE 1 , UE 2 ,. . . , UE n , and the MEC, specified by G = (K, f), where
. UE i can play with three variables, i.e., λ i , s i , and c i . It is clear that all these three variables can affect both T i and P i . Each of these variables must be in some appropriate interval. For instance, we require
To ensure ρ i < 1, we need
To ensure ρ < 1, we need
We also require
The strategy sets and payoff functions of the seven games are specified as follows.
• Game(λ i ):
• Game(s i ):
• Game(c i ):
• Game(λ i , s i ):
• Game(λ i , c i ):
• Game(s i , c i ):
• Game(λ i , s i , c i ):
The MEC can play with one variable, i.e., s, which can affect both T and P. We require
s should be reasonably large. In all the seven games, we have
C. EXISTENCE OF THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we show the existence of the Nash equilibrium of the games. For clarity of presentation, the derivations of all the first and second order partial derivatives are moved to Appendices 1 and 2.
For the MEC, we can show that 
For Game(λ i , s i ), Game(λ i , c i ), and Game(s i , c i ), we can show that the determinants of the following three matrices, i.e., 
are all positive, that is,
For Game(λ i , s i , c i ), the Hessian matrix is
which is positive definite, since the three leading principal minors of matrix H i , i.e.,
are all positive. Due to the sophistication of the partial derivatives, analytical proofs of the positiveness of leading principal minors seem infeasible. However, they can be demonstrated numerically (see Appendix 3).
VI. SOLUTIONS TO THE GAMES
In this section, we give the solutions to our games by developing algorithms to find the best responses of all players and an iterative algorithm to find the Nash equilibrium.
A. THE BEST RESPONSE OF A UE
In this section, we develop an algorithm to find the best response of a mobile user in each game.
1) GAME(λ i )
In this game, UE i needs to find λ i such that
Our numerical algorithm to find λ i such that ∂R i /∂λ i = 0 is given in Algorithm 1. The algorithm uses the classical bisection method (lines 2-10) based on the observation that ∂R i /∂λ i is an increasing function of λ i (lines 5-9), since ∂ 2 R i /∂λ 2 i > 0. (The standard bisection method is described in [3] , p. 22). Let I denote the maximum length of all initial search intervals in this paper. Then, the time complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(log(I / )). (We set = 10 −7 in this paper.)
Initialize the search interval of λ i ;
(1) while (the length of the search interval is ≥ ) do (2) λ i ← the middle point of the search interval; 
2) GAME(s i )
In this game, UE i needs to find s i such that
Our numerical algorithm to find s i such that ∂R i /∂s i = 0 is given in Algorithm 2 with s i = 5.0, which is similar to Algorithm 1. The time complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(log(I / )).
3) GAME(c i )
In this game, UE i needs to find c i such that Input:
Initialize the search interval of s i ;
(1) while (the length of the search interval is ≥ ) do (2) s i ← the middle point of the search interval; Input:
Initialize the search interval of c i ;
(1) while (the length of the search interval is ≥ ) do (2) c i ← the middle point of the search interval; 
4) GAME(λ i , s i )
In this game, UE i needs to find λ i and s i such that
Solving these two sophisticated nonlinear equations simultaneously needs special insight. For a fixed s i , letR 
where is a sufficiently small quantity. (We set = 10 −5 in this paper.) Our numerical algorithm to find λ i and s i such that 
Algorithm 4: Find λ i and s i
Input: In this game, UE i needs to find λ i and c i such that
For a fixed c i , letR Input: In this game, UE i needs to find s i and c i such that
and 
Algorithm 6: Find s i and c i
Input: (15)
In this game, UE i needs to find λ i , s i , and c i such that
For a fixed c i , letR 
B. THE BEST RESPONSE OF AN MEC
In this section, we develop an algorithm to find the best response of the mobile edge cloud. The MEC needs to find s such that ∂R ∂s = T ∂P ∂s + P ∂T ∂s = 0.
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Our numerical algorithm to find s such that ∂R/∂s = 0 is given in Algorithm 8 with s = 5.0, which is similar to Algorithm 1. The time complexity of Algorithm 8 is O(log(I / )).
Algorithm 7: Find λ i , s i , and c i
Input: 
C. AN ITERATIVE ALGORITHM FOR NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we develop an iterative algorithm to find the Nash equilibrium. Algorithm 9 runs in rounds (lines [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . In each round, every mobile user finds his best response to the current situation by using Algorithms 1-7 (lines 3-5). The mobile edge server also finds its best response to the current situation by using Algorithm 8 (line 6). The algorithm terminates when the action profiles of two successive rounds are close enough (lines 8-13). The final converged action profile x * = (x * 1 , x * 2 , . . . , x * n , x * n+1 ) is returned as the Nash equilibrium, i.e., a strategy profile with the property that no player can benefit from a unilateral deviation from x * i , if all the other players act according to it.
Algorithm 9:
Calculate the Nash Equilibrium
Obtain x i by using Algorithms 1-7; (4) end do;
(5) Obtain s by using Algorithm 8;
The termination detection condition in line 8 is
Since Algorithm j (1 ≤ j ≤ 7) is invoked n times in each round, the time complexity of each round is O(n(log(I / )) 3 ), and the overall time complexity of Algorithm 9 is O(Nn(log(I / )) 3 ), where N is the number of rounds, which is mainly determined by the accuracy requirement δ in line 8. (We set δ = 10 −5 in this paper.)
VII. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES AND PERFORMANCE DATA
In this section, we present numerical examples and performance data.
A. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we demonstrate numerical examples of our algorithms. Throughout this section, we consider a mobile edge computing environment with n = 10 UEs and a single MEC. The parameters of UE i are set as follows:λ i = 1.5 + 0.05(i − 1) tasks/second, λ i = 0.41λ i tasks/second, r i = 1.5+0.05(i−1) 
BI, r
The parameters of the MEC are set as follows: m = 7, s = 3.5 BI/second, ξ = 0.5, α = 2.0, P s = 1.5 Watts. Table 2 shows the above parameters of a mobile edge computing environment, and the resulting performance data for the idle-speed model. The data for the constant-speed model are similar, with slightly increased P comp,i , P i , and R i . In the following, we illustrate the best responses of the players by using Algorithm 1-8. Let us consider UE 5 .
Using Algorithm 1, UE 5 sets λ 5 = 0.75861, which results in T 5 = 4.46716, P 5 = 3.61915, and R 5 = 16.16733. It is clear that compared with the original parameter setting in Table 2 , UE 5 increases the amount of computation offloading, which gives rise to reduced average response time, reduced average power consumption, and reduced cost-performance ratio.
Using Algorithm 2, UE 5 sets s 5 = 2.76593, which results in T 5 = 2.26622, P 5 = 4.94440, and R 5 = 11.20509. It is clear that compared with the original parameter setting in Table 2 , UE 5 increases the server execution speed, which gives rise to significantly reduced average response time, increased average power consumption, and significantly reduced cost-performance ratio.
Using Algorithm 3, UE 5 sets c 5 = 7.28516, which results in T 5 = 4.31685, P 5 = 3.87771, and R 5 = 16.73950. It is clear that compared with the original parameter setting in Table 2 , UE 5 increases the data communication speed, which gives rise to reduced average response time, slightly increased average power consumption, and reduced cost-performance ratio.
Using Algorithm 4, UE 5 sets λ 5 = 0.47826 and s 5 = 3.40000, which result in T 5 = 1.33269, P 5 = 6.76697, and R 5 = 9.01830. It is clear that compared with the original parameter setting in Table 2 , UE 5 reduces the amount of computation offloading and increases the server execution speed, which gives rise to significantly reduced average response time, increased average power consumption, and significantly reduced cost-performance ratio.
Using Algorithm 5, UE 5 sets λ 5 = 0.96903 and c 5 = 11.06776, which result in T 5 = 2.28860, P 5 = 3.54369, and R 5 = 8.11010. It is clear that compared with the original parameter setting in Table 2 , UE 5 increases the amount of computation offloading and increases the data communication speed, which gives rise to significantly reduced average response time, reduced average power consumption, and significantly reduced cost-performance ratio.
Using Algorithm 6, UE 5 sets s 5 = 3.37633 and c 5 = 11.51681, which result in T 5 = 1.18285, P 5 = 6.10672, and R 5 = 7.22335. It is clear that compared with the original parameter setting in Table 2 , UE 5 increases the server execution speed and increases the data communication speed, which gives rise to significantly reduced average response time, increased average power consumption, and significantly reduced cost-performance ratio.
Using Algorithm 7, UE 5 sets λ 5 = 0.67529, s 5 = 3.40000, and c 5 = 11.45013, which result in T 5 = 1.16043, P 5 = 6.21933, and R 5 = 7.21709. It is clear that compared with the original parameter setting in Table 2 , UE 5 reduces the amount of computation offloading, increases the server execution speed, and increases the data communication speed, which gives rise to significantly reduced average response time, increased average power consumption, and significantly reduced cost-performance ratio. Table 2 , the MEC increases the server execution speed, which gives rise to significantly reduced average response time, increased average power consumption, and significantly reduced cost-performance ratio.
B. PERFORMANCE DATA
In this section, we demonstrate performance data of our games. For clarity of presentation, all performance data are moved to Appendix 4.
1) GAME(λ i )
Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate performance data of Game(λ i ) for the idle-speed model and the constant-speed model respectively. It is clear that in the stable situation, compared with the original parameter setting in Table 2 , all UEs increase their amount of computation offloading and get reduced average response time, reduced average power consumption, and reduced cost-performance ratio. The MEC sets its server execution speed to the maximum available, and gets reduced average response time, increased average power consumption, and increased cost-performance ratio.
2) GAME(s i ) Tables 7 and 8 the original parameter setting in Table 2 , all UEs and the MEC choose high server execution speeds, and all get significantly reduced average response time, increased average power consumption, and significantly reduced cost-performance ratio.
3) GAME(c i )
Tables 9 and 10 demonstrate performance data of Game(c i ) for the idle-speed model and the constant-speed model respectively. It is clear that in the stable situation, compared with the original parameter setting in Table 2 , all UEs increase the data communication speed, and get reduced average response time, slightly increased average power consumption, and reduced cost-performance ratio. The MEC increases its server execution speed and gets significantly reduced average response time, reduced average power consumption, and significantly reduced cost-performance ratio.
4) GAME(λ i , s i )
Tables 11 and 12 demonstrate performance data of Game(λ i , s i ) for the idle-speed model and the constant-speed model respectively. It is clear that for the idle-speed mode, in the stable situation, compared with the original parameter setting in Table 2 , UE 1 and UE 2 increase their amount of computation offloading and choose the lowest available server execution speed, and get significantly reduced average response time, reduced average power consumption, and significantly reduced cost-performance ratio. UE 3 , UE 4 ,. . . , UE 10 decrease/increase their amount of computation offloading and choose the highest available server execution speed, and get significantly reduced average response time, increased average power consumption, and significantly reduced cost-performance ratio. For the constant-speed mode, compared with the original parameter setting in Table 2 , UE 1 , UE 2 ,. . . , UE 5 increase their amount of computation offloading and choose low server execution speeds, and get significantly reduced average response time, reduced average power consumption, and significantly reduced cost-performance ratio. UE 6 , UE 7 ,. . . , UE 10 decrease their amount of computation offloading and choose the highest available server execution speed, and get significantly reduced average response time, increased average power consumption, and significantly reduced cost-performance ratio. The MEC sets its server execution speed to the maximum available, and gets reduced average response time, increased average power consumption, and reduced cost-performance ratio.
5) GAME(λ i , c i )
Tables 13 and 14 demonstrate performance data of Game(λ i , c i ) for the idle-speed model and the constant-speed model respectively. It is clear that in the stable situation, compared with the original parameter setting in Table 2 , all UEs increase their amount of computation offloading and increase the data communication speed, and get significantly reduced average response time, significantly reduced average power consumption, and significantly reduced cost-performance ratio. The MEC sets its server execution speed to the maximum available, and gets significantly reduced average response time, increased average power consumption, and reduced cost-performance ratio.
6) GAME(s i , c i )
Tables 15 and 16 demonstrate performance data of Game(s i , c i ) for the idle-speed model and the constant-speed model respectively. It is clear that in the stable situation, compared with the original parameter setting in Table 2 , all UEs choose high server execution and data communication speeds, and get significantly reduced average response time, increased average power consumption, and significantly reduced cost-performance ratio. The MEC increases its server execution speed and gets significantly reduced average response time, reduced average power consumption, and significantly reduced cost-performance ratio.
Tables 17 and 18 demonstrate performance data of Game(λ i , s i , c i ) for the idle-speed model and the constantspeed model respectively. It is clear that in the stable situation, compared with the original parameter setting in Table 2 , all UEs increase their amount of computation offloading, choose low server execution speeds (except UE 9 and UE 10 ), and choose high data communication speeds, and get significantly reduced average response time, reduced average power consumption (except UE 9 and UE 10 ), and significantly reduced cost-performance ratio. The MEC sets its server execution speed to the maximum available, and gets reduced average response time, increased average power consumption, and reduced cost-performance ratio. VOLUME 7, 2019 
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have established a non-cooperative game framework to study stabilization of a competitive mobile edge computing environment. Our framework includes a set of non-cooperative games for multiple heterogeneous mobile users and a mobile edge cloud to play. All players can optimize their cost-performance ratios by using the algorithms developed in this paper. Furthermore, we are able to obtain the Nash equilibrium of the games, so that we can examine the stable situation of a competitive mobile edge computing environment. Our investigation in this paper can help each UE and MEC to optimize a combined quantity of performance and cost, and can provide an environment in which everyone's benefit is optimized and no one wants to change.
The research in this paper can be extended to multiple heterogeneous MECs. In this case, there is a load distribution problem for each UE, i.e., how the offloaded tasks are distributed to the multiple MECs. In addition, each UE should also decide the data transmission rate to each MEC. Therefore, each UE has 2k+1 parameters to determine, where k is the number of MECs. Hence, the convex optimization problem for each UE is significantly more complicated than the situation of a single MEC. The stability problem for such a competitive mobile edge computing environment is much more challenging to solve, and certainly, more interesting. As mentioned earlier, one special case of the above problem has been solved in [20] , where only the load distribution (i.e., computation offloading strategy optimization) problem was solved; however, there was no consideration on computation/communication speeds optimization.
APPENDIX 1. DERIVATION OF FIRST ORDER PARTIAL DERIVATIVES
(1) ∂T i /∂λ i :
(2) ∂T i /∂s i :
for the idle-speed model, and for the idle-speed model, and
APPENDIX 3. NUMERICAL DEMONSTRATION
For the same parameter setting in Section 7.1, Tables 3 and 4 show that all the leading principal minors mentioned in Section 5.3 are positive.
APPENDIX 4. PERFORMANCE DATA OF THE GAMES
Tables 5-18 demonstrate the performance data of our games. They are explained in Section 7.2.
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